Penal Codes that followed independence from Spain (1821) represented a series of necessary if halting steps towards a modern legal infrastructure 4 . For legal refor mers, modern criminal laws were a harbinger of modern social relations which pre sented, like the nation's various constitutions, an ideal to which the progressing nation might aspire 5 . This interpretation has much to recommend it: Mexican peno logists understood and acted upon the latest international (primarily European) advances in criminal law. Moreover, their legacy persists: Mexico's criminal laws were (and are) as modern as any in the world 6 . This progressive vision is somewhat deceptive. Just as modernizing discourses like criminology re-articulated traditional concerns about class, race, and gender; penology also exhibited strong ties to Mexico's past 7 . In the tumultuous post-Inde pendence decades, most liberal penologists -and penologists were by and large liberal -stuck resolutely to revolutionary principles of universal human rights and absolute equality under the law. But with the consolidation of liberal power in the late nineteenth-century, mainstream policy makers began to construct an elitist « scientific politics » that represented -under the guise of Mexicanizing the « meta physical » Jacobin agenda of mid-century liberals -a return to colonial-style pater nalism, albeit with a technocratic slant 8 . And, despite significant changes in public policy after Mexico's great social revolution (1910) (1911) (1912) (1913) (1914) (1915) (1916) (1917) (1918) (1919) (1920) , paternalism -this time under the auspices of the post-revolutionary estado papá -remained the preferred mode for social and legal reform efforts.
Both visions of Mexican criminal law -one looking forward, the other backwere part of ongoing elite efforts to re-legitimize political control in the shifting dis cursive terrain that announced (or so they hoped) the onset of modernity. These relegitimation efforts began with the « enlightened » reforms of late eighteenth-cen tury Bourbon monarchs (c. 1760s-1810), took a Jacobin turn after Independence as liberals wrested control of the central government from their conservative rivals (by 1867), acquired a technocratic gloss under Porfirio Diaz's autocratic gaze , and culminated in the post-revolutionary paternalistic populism of Lázaro Cárdenas (1934 Cárdenas ( -1940 . In practice, legal modernization often produced contention and disorder -witness the nineteenth-century liberal « reform » laws attacking cor porate privilege that raised the considerable ire of the Catholic Church, Army, and incorporated Indian communities. But not all legal reform threatened social order. Mexican penologists argued that criminal law with its far-reaching punitive power, especially over the recently « empowered » lower classes, represented a particularly potent source of political legitimacy. And, as the sovereign « people » came to play an ever larger role in the elite political imaginary (if not in actual politics), popular acceptance of legal authority emerged as an area of special concern 9 . In this ideologically-charged context, the somewhat arcane legal issue of judicial discretion -the individual magistrate's ability to tailor punishment to suit the crime -became an important site of contestation, among elite policy makers at least, over the nature of the liberal state. The end result, the 1931 federal Penal Code, was a step forward, reflecting the latest international advances in penology; it was also a step back, returning judicial discretionary powers eroded by a century of liberal attacks on « arbitrary » colonial criminal justice. On the surface, increased judicial discre tion promised and, doubtless in some cases, delivered a more responsive criminal justice system that buttressed the state's legitimacy much as earlier Bourbon reforms had done in the decades preceding Independence 10 . Moreover, popular pressureresponding perhaps to a political system bound together by patron-client relationsencouraged and supported the shift11. At the same time, increased discretion rein forced a paternalistic approach to state-citizen relations that would come to fruition with tata Cárdenas's consolidation of the estado papá in the late 1930s.
Social theorist Jürgen Habermas has argued that «refeudalization» is an inevi table by-product of the transformation of the Liberal Constitutional State into a Social-Welfare State where « publicity imitates the kind of aura proper to personal prestige and supernatural representation» typical of pre-Enlightenment European monarchies 12 . This was certainly the case in Mexico. Mexican policy makers saw increased judicial discretion -which manifested «the aura proper to personal pres tige» of judges -as a form of «publicity » that publicly represented the populist aspirations of the post-revolutionary nation-state. Not coincidentally, the decisive shift occurred at the precise moment (1929) when a newly-constituted official party -precursor to the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) which still controls the presidency -was poised to abandon traditional modes of democratic representation in favor of a «modern,» corporatist one-party state.
The combination of modernity, nationalism, and paternalism has proven potent if not quite hegemonic. The 1931 Penal Code, although much revised, is still in place. So too, at least for the near future, is the paternalistic political system that pro duced it. This remarkable durability, especially in a region not known for stability, has been much noted but never adequately explained. And while a definitive expla nation for the Mexican « exception » is far beyond the scope of this essay (it's mys teries may well elude scholars for years to come), this brief history of judicial dis cretion seeks to provide a crucial piece to that larger puzzle by exploring the way elite policy makers used legal reform to forge a truly paternal fatherland 13 .
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Seen in this light, the deep historical roots of current president Ernesto Zedillo's early efforts to dif fuse criticism of his troubled regime with a highly publicized reform of the criminal justice system are very apparent.
REJECTING THE COLONIAL LEGACY
Colonial criminal law institutionalized social inequalities by punishing convicted criminals according to their legally-defined social, racial, or corporate status. The shift after Independence to a «liberal» legal system in which all citizens were theoretically equal thus marked a watershed in Mexican penal law.
It was a watershed that would last fifty years ! Drawing on French, Spanish, and North American constitutional commitments to «the rights of man and citizen,» Mexico's liberal 1824 Constitution guaranteed legal equality for all Mexican citizens thus apparently ending institutionalized discrimination and bolstering the legitimacy of secession 14 . Ironically, the political instability that followed Independence forced practitioners to fall back on Spanish colonial criminal (and civil) law and procedures, especially the medieval Siete Partidas (1265) and the Novísima Recopilación (1805). Supplemented by stop-gap criminal legislation intended to restore public order, this confusing situation persisted until the promulgation of a Penal Code by the liberal Juárez regime in 1871
15 . But despite post-Independence political disputes between liberals and conservatives that blocked attempts to develop a Mexican Penal Code, the reform and codification of criminal laws was a widely acknowledged desideratum. Early on, Enlightenment-inspired works on crime and punishment had found a sympathetic ear in Mexico. In his world-renowned 1764 essay, Dei delitti e delle pene (On Crime and Punishment), Italian jurist Cesare Beccaria suggested a rationalization of criminal justice that English legal philosopher Jeremy Bentham would later elaborate into a utilitarian moral calculus -«the greatest happiness of the greatest number» -and a notorious but influential proto-penitentiary, the panopticon 16 . As «enlightened» Bourbon reformers and post-Independence Mexican policy makers struggled with the perceived increase in crime that accompanied political and economic modernization, the legal theories of European social reformers like Beccaria and Bentham played an important role in informing the educated public imagination. Even before the break with Spain, Mexican-born (if staunchly loyalist) jurist Manuel de Lardizábal y Uribe had insisted that « nothing is more important to a nation than having good criminal laws because they ensure civil liberty and, in large part, the wellbeing and security of the State». He warned, however, that «there is no enterprise more difficult than the perfection of criminal legislation » 17 . Such was the case in independent Mexico. In his 1839 Pandectas Hispano Megicanas, Juan N. Rodríguez de San Miguel summarized the practical problems that emerged from the colonial legal legacy:
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On constitutional guarantees see Rabasa (1990 In an era of political violence that exacerbated elite fears of popular mobilization such warnings seemed prescient; the need to reform criminal law painfully obvious. « Criminal legislations Mora's liberal colleague Manuel Otero advised, «is at the same time the foundation and proof of social institutions». And, while recognizing the inevitability of crime, he argued that the conscientious legislator «needs to demonstrate his genius by conquering bad inclinations, setting men on the path of duty... governing society, pushing it towards the good, guiding it to perfection» 20 . For Otero, good criminal laws would not only repress the criminal but instruct the potential citizen thereby ensuring their popular acceptance, a necessary prerequisite to social progress in a modern democratic republic.
One proposed solution was adoption of the jury system. Mora even advocated popular juries in an 1827 «dissertation» for his law degree noting that jurors were less susceptible to corruption than judges and more in tune with the criminal justice system's typically lower-class clientele. In what was to become a classic riposte, oppo nents countered that juries were inappropriate for « our population and territory », because to be effective they required an educated, moral citizenry which «is disgra cefully not characteristic of most of our population » 23 . Not surprisingly, in 1869, when legislators amended criminal procedures to include juries for some cases, they compromised; literacy and income requirements effectively excluded lower-class participation 24 .
But in spite of disputes over the extent of popular empowerment, legal reformers clearly recognized the pressing need to reform criminal laws and procedures. They also stressed the importance of popular acceptance of, if not always active partici pation in, the criminal justice system. In fact, attempts to reconcile (at least discur sively) the potentially conflicted requirements of appropriate institutions and popu lar acceptance became the hallmark of future Mexican criminal jurisprudence. By the mid nineteenth century the terms of the debate had been chosen; the exact mea ning of those terms, however, was far from clear.
CODIFYING CRIMINAL LAW
The promulgation of the liberal 1857 Constitution which included Mexico's first real bill of rights marked the crucial first step toward the codification of Mexican cri minal law. The Constitution officially ended many of the more onerous aspects of colonial criminal law: not only legal discrimination, but also most special tribunals, unauthorized arrest, lengthy detention, torture, unlawful seizure of property, and transcendental punishment. Procedure was reformed as well. The Constitution elimi nated court fees, making the judicial system economically accessible to all Mexicans. Article 20 guaranteed Mexican citizens accused of crimes the following rights: I.
That they be informed of the motive for the proceeding and the name of the accuser if one existed.
II. That their preliminary statement be taken within forty-eight hours...
III. That they be allowed to confront the witnesses against them.
IV. That they have easy access to the facts needed to prepare their defense.
V.
That they and persons they trusted be allowed to testify on their behalf. And, if they had no one to defend them, that they be given a list of public defenders from which to choose 25 .
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Ibid., p. 351. Mexico's relative backwardness also served to justify keeping the death penalty until the development of a reformative penitentiary system. Capital punishment was, however, restricted to serious crimes like murder and political criminals, excepting traitors, were no longer eligible for execution. Ibid., p. 1347. Drafters of the 1857 Constitution clearly intended these rights, typical of most nineteenth-century liberal constitutions, to correct the most egregious failures of colonial criminal justice, facilitate popular acceptance of the liberal regime, and set the parameters of subsequent criminal law.
These lofty goals were not easily realized. By incorporating controversial « reform » laws that sought to undermine the considerable power of corporate enti ties like the Catholic Church and the army, the 1857 Constitution sparked a bloody three-year civil war. With the legal assault on corporations tearing Mexico apart, the liberal push to reform criminal law, a generally well-regarded and non-controversial project, became even more acute. In 1862, with the liberals temporarily victorious, Benito Juarez's Minister of Justice Jesus Terán appointed a commission to formulate a Penal Code for the Federal District and Territory of Baja California. His conserva tive opponents, however, were far from finished. The successful French invasion in May of the following year and puppet emperor Maximilian's subsequent three-year reign further delayed liberal penal reform efforts. But, following liberal victory in 1867, Juarez reformed his cabinet, appointing former Penal Code commission mem ber Antonio Martinez de Castro as his Minister of Justice and Public Instruction.
Martinez de Castro moved quickly. Just a year later, the Penal Code commission was up and running again 26 . In his 1868 message to Congress, he reminded deputies of the legitimizing potential of reformed criminal laws. «The punishments applied today are truly arbitrary», Martinez de Castro admonished, «and ought to be repla ced by others better suited to the nature of the crimes, and which will not deprive pri soners of their modesty, their shame, nor the hope of rehabilitating themselves in the public eye». He added with a characteristic utilitarian faith in the value of public instruction that:
...in publishing a good Penal Code that even the poorest can acquire at little cost, so that they might learn their duties, know the deformity of crime, and advise themselves of the punishments they might incur, one will doubtless see a rapid decline in the number of delinquents 27 .
Appropriately enough, as Minister of Justice and Public Instruction, Martinez de Castro was charged not only with drafting a Penal Code but also with educating the populace so that they could read it. These were the halcyon days of public education in Mexico; although the most notable achievement, Gabino Barreda's founding of the Escuela Nacional Preparatoria with its « scientific » positivist education, benefit ed mostly elite males. Unfortunately, the immense task of educating the lower classes and thus realizing Martinez de Castro's dream of a didactic Penal Code would quickly prove beyond the means (and possibly the intentions) of the fledgling liberal state. Nevertheless, the desire to win popular acceptance for the criminal justice sys tem, and thus legitimacy for the liberal regime, persisted, and with some success. 30 . This Penal Code was, for its principal author, both conceptually up-to-date and eminently suited to Mexico's unique historical and geographical situation, two crucial criteria at least for elite acceptance.
The code was also designed to attract the popular support deemed crucial to domestic tranquility. After the fifty years of post-Independence turmoil, Martinez de Castro concluded, «the authorities have not been able to count on public coopera tion, and because of this they have been unable to guarantee the public security which is essential to the prosperity of the arts, industry, and commerce » 31 . A wellordered, easily accessible Penal Code that promised speedy, impartial, moderate jus tice ; that reformed prisons, ended presidio confinements, and forced labor seemed just the remedy for Mexico's ills. The 1871 Penal Code thus attacked the perceived essence of the colonial criminal justice system: inhumane punishment and exces sive judicial discretion which encouraged arbitrary justice.
To ensure impartiality and moderation, the code provided an elaborately calibra ted system of punishments that left little room for the capricious exercise of judicial discretion by an individual magistrate. A product of classic criminology via English legal theorist Jeremy Bentham, this punitive calculus reflected Martinez de Castro's profound faith in human rationality 32 . Article 4 stated plainly that «Crime is: the voluntary infraction of a penal law, doing that which it prohibits or neglecting to do that which it demands»33 (CP: 7. My italics). Further, those without the ability to reason -young children, the insane, the senile, deaf mutes, and even loyal servants acting under orders -lacked the requisite « criminal responsibility » or «imputabi-lity » and could not be convicted of a crime 34 (CP: 13-14,47). Assuming a rational, « responsible » criminal meant that punishments could be rationalized as well. And, to ensure that judicial rationality was exercised in the national interest rather than in the personal or class interests of an individual magis trate, this system was deliberately formulaic. For example, the Penal Code recogni zed four levels of criminal acts -planned, intended, frustrated, consummated -each punished with increasing severity (CP: 10). It also recognized four classes of atte nuating and aggravating circumstances with each circumstance augmenting or dimi- nishing punishment by a set proportion according to its class. Attenuating circum stances could be simply « good prior customs » or anything that indicated a uninten tionally diminished capacity to reason such as involuntary drunkenness or gross «ignorance». Conversely, aggravating circumstances might include the use of vio lence or disguises, taking advantage of a riot, abuse of confidence, or simply having had enough education to know better (CP: 14-21). Recidivism, always a source of grave concern, was a special aggravating circumstance and could drastically increase punishment especially if the repeat offense was more serious than its pre decessor (CP: 58-59). Both lists of circumstances were long and fairly explicit, lea ving little apparent room for arbitrary judicial maneuvers. Using these pre-determined formulas, then, a judge need only establish guilt and determine circumstances in order to calculate the proper punishment. In this classic liberal formulation of «rule of law,» rationality was a systemic rather than an individual trait; pre-determined punishments, equally applied, ensured impartiality to a presumably skeptical people accustomed to capricious colonial justice. The extensive section of the Penal Code devoted exclusively to the crimes of public functionaries and legal representa tives served a similar redemptive purpose 36 (CP: 221-236). Judicial discretion, although severely limited, was not without its place in this rationalized system. A judge could grant a « preparatory liberty » (libertad preparatoria) under police supervision to inmates who exhibited «good behavior»in prison and who had the means to support themselves once released. In keeping with its rationalist premises, the Penal Code defined good behavior as « positive acts » on the part of the inmate, « habits of order, work, and morality, and especially having domi nated the passion or inclination that led to crime » 37 (CP: 34). Preparatory liberty thus rewarded normative behavior and complemented the rehabilitation process begun in prison. But the Penal Code limited even this grant of judicial discretion to a simple decision for or against the inmate 38 . Although it clearly recognized the need to individualize punishment, the manifesto of later positivist-inspired penology, the 1871 Penal Code tightly controlled judicial discretion. Liberal « memories » of arbi trary colonial justice were still too fresh.
PRESERVING THE STATUS QUO: THE PORFIRIAN REVISIONS
This reluctance diminished as the century waned. Firmly in power after the defeat and execution of Maximilian in 1867, fin-de-siecle liberal presidents Benito Juarez, Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada, Porfirio Díaz, and Manuel Gonzalez encouraged a more authoritarian brand of liberalism that they hoped would undermine the power of regional strongmen (caciques) and accelerate national economic development. The growing influence of positivist ideas in Mexico -an eclectic mixture of Comtean scientism and Spencerian social darwinism -especially during second half of the Porfiriato (1876-1911) provided ideological justification for oligarchical rule (although in a nominally liberal context) and encouraged the development of a « scientific politics » appropriately administered by elite technocrats or científicos.
In spite of its enormous prestige, however, Positivism had little immediate effect on Mexican criminal law. Although very much aware of the latest advances in European criminology, including the vigorous debate between Italian and French criminologists over the principal source (heredity or milieu) of criminal behavior, cientí-fico reformers preferred a gradualist approach to penal reform that respected the integrity of the 1871 code in spite of its presumably metaphysical views on crime and punishment. Headed by prominent penologist Miguel S. Macedo, the commission established in 1903 to revise the Penal Code even refused to correct grammatical or stylistic errors in the text unless these errors obscured or distorted its meaning. The commission saw fit only to modify vague language and update laws that had proved either too harsh, too lenient or unworkable in the courtroom. For example, the commission simplified procedures and encouraged fines rather than incarceration for those convicted of public drunkenness while at the same time expanding the penalties and requirements for recidivism and illegal public disturbances 39 . In general, however, commission members saw little reason to do more than «respect the general principles of the 1871 Code, conserve the nucleus of its system and limit [themselves] to incorporating only the new precepts or new institutions whose usefulness had been proven and whose inclusion is demanded by the present social state of the nation » 40 . The only significant addition, a North American style parole system (condena condicional), did somewhat further judicial discretion and the individualization of punishment. Even this «innovation », however, retained the rationalist premise that rewarding non-dangerous criminals for good behavior would help reverse their descent into criminality.
In the conservative estimation of penologists like Macedo, practical positivist concerns about appropriate response to social realities outweighed the theoretical concerns of positivist criminology which argued that proper social defense should base the punishment of criminals solely on their « dangerousness » to society. Thus the Porfirian Penal Code revisions, finally completed in June, 1912 during Francisco Madero's troubled presidency, modified rather than revised Martinez's liberal code 41 . In his chapter on Mexico's «judicial evolution » in the ambitious Porfirian positivist history, México: su evolución social, Jorge Vera Estañol explained this legal conservatism in social darwinistic terms. « An abyss», he observed, «divides societies whose progress is intrinsic from those that have managed it thanks to the irresistible contagion of foreign institutions ». He added pessimistically that «only time is capable of serving as a gigantic bridge to a vigorous race » 42 . For Porfirian penologists, the liberal legal revolution that overthrew the colonial legal system represented a premature, ill-considered (although most agreed necessary and inevitable) attempt to radically alter Mexican society. Conversely, this time around, an appropriate response would respect social realities including the need to modernize (socially at least) in a gradual, controlled fashion. Legal evolution would occur in Mexico but slowly so as not to disturb newly won « order and progress ». The argument was positivistic but reflected a profoundly conservative positivism that defined social change in nearly glacial terms. Paradoxically, by the early years of the twentieth century, the post-Independence liberal legal revolution had become a permanent fixture of the social landscape, an institution to be carefully nurtured and perhaps judiciously modified but never unduly shocked or uprooted. The Mexican Revolution would change all that.
PUNISHING THE CRIMINAL: THE REVOLUTION AND POSITIVIST PENOLOGY
Disorganized and unsystematic, Porfirian criminology had been ill-equipped to challenge the legal establishment. A criminologist of sorts himself, Macedo had publicly criticized liberal penology and lauded the «ever broadening horizons» opened by the « study of crime as a natural phenomenon » 43 . Positivist criminology, however, had more impact on his discourse than his Penal Code reforms. A traditionalist at heart, he continued to use classical legal texts in his law classes 44 . Nevertheless, the professionalization of criminology and the consolidation of the scientific criminological paradigm in the years following the Revolution had made the positivist criminological agenda more difficult to ignore 45 . In the eyes of most knowledgeable observers, positivist critiques called into question the continued legitimacy and, by extension, the legitimizing potential of Mexican criminal law. Coming on the heels of a massive social revolution that promised social justice for all Mexicans, the push for legal reform to complement political change took on still greater intensity. Even Macedo's conservative colleague, law professor Antonio Ramos Pedrueza began his revolutionary-era course in penal law with a detailed discussion of the relative merits of classic and positivist criminology that attacked the underlying premises of Mexican criminal law 46 . Taking inspiration from Italian criminologist Enrico Ferri, Ramos concluded that the rational criminal, the foundation of classic criminology, had never existed. « Observed reality in prisons and asylums affirms that delinquents are abnormal», he noted, «...admitting nevertheless that they are very different and that the passage from hardened criminal type to normal human type is not a brusque transition but a series of gradations, just as in animal species ». After positivist criminologists' discovery of What the commission attempted was nothing less than a theoretical revolution in Mexican criminal law. As positivists, they insisted on contextualizing crime. The classical school, Almaraz observed with some exaggeration, « forgets the criminal and concerns itself only with the crime committed ». Attempting « absolute mathe matical equality between crime and punishment », he insisted, often resulted in inap propriate punishments. This formulaic system inevitably released unreformed dan gerous criminals back into society, while at the same time it condemned relatively harmless incidental criminals to the corrupting influence of prison confinement. Under the classical legal regimen, Almaraz declared, « the toxic current of crime grows day by day» (ECP : 14-15). As an antidote to this misguided rationalism, the commission argued for a fundamental redefinition of the criminal act as « a natural product, born not of free will but of physical, anthropological, and social factors » (ECP : 18). The theoretical inspiration was probably French sociologist Emile Dur kheim whose influential 1893 Rules of the Sociological Method had insisted that crime was a normal «social fact» in all human societies. Moreover, with a purpor tedly revolutionary regime in power, lingering social inequalities -exacerbated loy Porfirian abuses -provided an easy scapegoat for Mexico's latest crime wave and helped legitimize the new political order bent on their eventual elimination.
Having determined the causes of crime, the commission then sought to redefine criminal responsibility. For classical penology, establishing the rationality of the individual criminal was a prerequisite to punishment; to positivists like Almaraz, this seemed absurd. « Given that infractors reveal hereditary or acquired, permanent or temporary bio-psychic anomalies,* Almaraz argued, « the foundations of a fight against delinquency based on moral responsibility disappear and the entire classical edifice comes crashing to the ground ». He concluded that healthy,« rational» socie ties, in a social darwinistic spirit of self preservation, protected themselves from all threats regardless of motivation. In fact, this conflation of social health and social rationality effectively denied rationality to any individual «organism» that threate ned society's collective well-being. Recognizing this fundamental discursive shift, Almaraz proposed that «social responsibility» replace moral responsibility and that « sanctions » substitute for punishments in a more workable, non-moralistic system of « social defense » (ECP: 18-19).
This discursive shift carried two important corollaries. First, by privileging an abstraction, criminality, over the more narrow category of lawbreaker it encompas sed many more people. « An individual can be dangerous to society », Almaraz advi sed, «even before committing a crime (lesionar un derecho)» and he especially sin gled out alcoholics, drug addicts, vagrants, beggars, and even paranoids (ECP: 20). Mexican elites had traditionally persecuted most of these groups. Nevertheless the legal sanctioning of potentially (but not always technically) criminal categoriespunishing states of mind rather than pre-defined criminal acts -was one inevitable and potentially portentous consequence of using social defense as the principal cri teria for criminal law. « All law is essentially doctrine », Almaraz reminded his rea ders, «... politically personalized doctrine» (ECP: 12. His italics).
The second corollary, typical of positivist endeavors, was a considerable expan sion in the prestige and scope of scientifically trained experts. Any serious attempt to transcend a relatively simple determination of guilt and to evaluate the dangerousness (estado peligroso) of an individual criminal required considerable expertise. Almaraz warned that «the prior and indispensable study of the delin quent's integral personality demands functionaries and judges trained in the modern doctrines of criminal psychology» among which he included everything from endocrinology to the interpretation of tattoos (ECP: 100). This new requirement was clearly self-serving and designed to insinuate criminology into the justice sys tem by creating professional spaces for trained criminologists. It also ensured their domination of legal discourse. To this end, the 1929 Penal Code established a Supreme Council of Social Defense and Prevention to oversee the entire federal prison and detention system, supervise the «individualization of punishment,» and ensure that criminal justice personnel upheld the basic tenets of social defense (ECP: 54).
Other innovative features appeared as provisions of the new Penal Code. For example, in an effort to individualize punishment -to make the punishment suit the criminal rather than the crime -the revisory commission greatly expanded the alter natives to incarceration by broadening the parole system (condena condicional) and substituting fines for short sentences. To support these changes, the commission revived the time-honored complaint about corrupting prisons. «It is necessary to oppose short incarcerations », it advised,« which in their current form fail to correct, intimidate, or inoculate; but which oblige the first-time offender to transform him self into a professional [criminal]» (ECP: 53). Therapeutic solutions, especially for juveniles and the insane, were favored over simple incarceration and, in keeping with the principles of social defense, sanctions against the dangerous criminally insane could be extended indefinitely. Not surprisingly, this broadening of « sanc tions » required not only more professional training but greater judicial discretion in 
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Other critics lauded Almaraz's efforts to supplant out-dated classical precepts but argued that the new code failed to live up to its promise. One observer noted that «the code suffered from redundancies, occasional duplicity of concepts, contradic tions and difficulties of application» 51 . These obvious defects encouraged an overdetermined criticism that attacked the code's internal contradictions, theoretical foundations, and constitutionality. Another critic, for example, observed that although the code was purportedly based on theories of social defense and dangerousness in fact it retained the « objective criteria » of classical penology, in particu lar the formulaic system of aggravating and attenuating circumstances of the 1871 Penal Code. Also, its expanded system of sanctions included a confusing the Penal Code into line with modern criminological theory. Many, however, insis ted that the 1929 code had missed the point, promising a theoretical innovation that it failed to deliver and which was furthermore unsuited to Mexico's social and constitutional realities. Not coincidentally, these defects also undermined its ideolo gical potential. In the face of this barrage of criticism, interim president Emilio Portes Gil quickly established a new revisory commission. To avoid future dissension and resistance, the five voting members of the commission represented the heart of the capital's legal establishment: the Interior Ministry, Attorney The stated principles of the 1931 Penal Code then included not only the standard admonition to simplicity and clarity but a promise to modernize only « up to the point permitted by our constitutional framework, our judicial traditions, and our social and economic conditions » 56 . Commission spokesman Alfonso Teja Zabre argued that:
No school, doctrine, or penal system can serve as the integral foundation of a Penal Code. It is possible only to follow an eclectic and pragmatic tendency which is to say practical and realizable 57 .
Thus instead of positivist dogma, commission members focused on « pragma tic » means. Specific goals included a simplification of procedures, the effective reparation of damages, the individualization of punishment, a decreased reliance on abstract ethical standards (casuismo), and an increase in judicial discretion within constitutional limits 58 . The first two of these five goals addressed the practical fai lings of the 1929 code, the next two restated positivist critiques of classical peno logy. The last goal -increased judicial discretion -represented the new Penal Code's principal innovation. Articles 51 and 52 codified this increase in judicial discretion. Article 51 advi sed judges «inside legally-fixed limits» to take under consideration both « external circumstances » and «the peculiarities of the delinquent». Article 52 suggested that along with the traditional mitigating circumstances judges also consider «the spe cial conditions in which [the delinquent] found himself at the moment the crime was committed and other personal antecedents and conditions... that demonstrate his greater or lesser dangerousness (temibilidad)» 59 . Ceniceros and Garrido even sug gested that the positivist motto, «There are no crimes only criminals », should be modified to «There are no criminals only men» 60 . This mixture of traditional and modern, liberal and positivist, concerns typified the self-consciously pragmatic nature of the new code.
Like each of their predecessors, the supporters of the 1931 code argued that the new Penal Code was the first to reflect national realities. One observer noted that the 1931 code «modestly but firmly develops its desiderata in accordance with naked Mexican reality... recognizing, organizing, and balancing reality itself » 61 . Another remarked that:
The division of classes and castes by economic and racial differences in Mexico, causes grave difficulties in the application of penal laws, especially for unassimilated indigenous groups... The only recourse is to simplify norms and procedures, prescribing broad and generic regulations that effectively permit the individuali zation of sanctions 62 .
The argument that culturally and racially heterogenous Mexico required greater judicial latitude accorded with post-revolutionary concerns about addressing the needs of the now mobilized popular sectors. While the 1929 code had attempted a re-theorization of criminal law that appealed primarily to elite modernizers, the drafters of the 1931 Penal Code sought a broader audience. By individualizing punishment, they not only protected society from dangerous criminals but protected relatively harmless offenders from an arbitrary, mechanistic justice that even their positivist predecessors had been unable to supplant. To this end, the new code broa dened the range of punishments and abandoned the elaborate calculus of aggrava ting and attenuating circumstances that had characterized the two previous codes.
The expanded discretionary powers of the judge permitted a flexibility impos sible under previous Penal Codes. The ideological benefits of a more responsive jus tice system were obvious. Previously marginalized groups could now hope for cle mency from a sympathetic if paternalistic judge -a throwback to the colonial tradition of royal mercy preserved perhaps in more informal justice systems and thus eminently suited to perceived Mexican social realities63. The international vogue for state socialism and the desire to institutionalize (and thus control) popular justice doubtless encouraged paternalistic solutions as well.
In this case at least, modernity and tradition were not necessarily mutually exclu sive. Garrido's three criteria for the Penal Code included consideration of «the Some observers recognized potential dangers. Reviving traditional liberal concerns, one commentator warned that «judicial discretion requires a broad unders tanding on the part of those charged with applying the law, in order that it not turn into arbitrariness». The possible dangers of paternalism, however, seemed a small price to pay for the popular acceptance that would presumably result from a more flexible criminal justice system. «A fundamentally humane justice», Garrido advised, «... will take into account the sensibilities of the transgressor», adding that,« punishing a man of exquisite sensibilities is not the same as punishing a calloused and crude man» 66 . The argument could have come from Lardizábal himself. By the third decade of the twentieth century colonial legal institutions had receded far enough into the historical past to be viewed with a certain dispassionate nostalgia; the dangers of arbitrary justice somewhat mitigated by the assumed benefits of a paternal state.
The paternalism implicit in individualizing punishment was nothing new. Almaraz's code, for example, had fostered the paternalistic pretensions of positive crimi nology and by extension the place of positive criminologists in the criminal justice system. The Supreme Council of Social Defense and Prevention's central role in ensuring ideological correctness, however, had rankled the legal establishment. His opponents, most of them judges trained in criminology, had resisted this oversight for both practical and professional reasons; it created administrative problems and it usurped their authority. Increased judicial discretion, on the other hand, transfer red that authority from the Supreme Council (which subsequently dropped the « supreme » from its title) to the judges themselves. This represented a Pyrrhic vic tory for positive criminology: while it did permit judges greater latitude to indivi dualize punishment, the insistence on observing constitutional forms and thus meta physical liberal notions of human rights precluded any legal justification for a comprehensive program of social defense 67 . Consequently, after 1931, criminology became the handmaiden rather than the ultimate arbiter of the modern Mexican cri minal justice system. And again, theoretical inconsistencies -the mish-mash of libe ralism, state socialism, and neo-paternalism masquerading as «pragmatism* (or even Hegelian synthesis) -probably enhanced the 1931 Penal Code's ideological potential by appealing to a broad social spectrum for a wide variety of reasons 68 .
CONCLUSION
Evaluating the practical impact of legal reforms on the Mexican criminal justice system is considerably more difficult than determining its ideological contribution. Mexican criminal justice, like criminal justice in general, retains an important measure of its legitimacy through an inherent conservatism that respects the traditional expectations of its practitioners and clients. This conservative tendency must be acknowledged. When change occurs, its occurs most often at the ideological rather than the practical level; traditional forms take on new content without seriously affecting long-standing legal ritual. Whatever its practical consequences, drafters of the 1931 Penal Code, most of them judges themselves, returned limited discretionary powers to presiding magistrates so that they might better exercise a presumably flexible and benevolent judicial paternalism -a ideological harbinger of, perhaps even a rehearsal for, an estado papa whose supremacy is only now under serious challenge.
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